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COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF A WITNESS BEFORE A CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE
It is nqzestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress
in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent lcgislative action. It is
their unremitting obligatio' to respond to subpocuas, to respect the digniy of
the Congress and its committees and to testify ful, tth respect to suattcrs
within the province of proper investigation. This ... assumes that the...
rights of witnesses wiMl be respected by the Congress as they are in a court
of justice.,
On 'March 27, 1792, Congress inaugurated the first congressional investiga-
tion in America when it set up a committee to investigate the slaughter of
General St. Clair and his army by several Indian tribes.2 Thirty-five years later
the House of Representatives employed for the first time a congressional com-
mittee backed by the contempt power.3 In 1S59, the Senate used such a com-
mittee to inquire into the invasion and seizure of a United States armory and
arsenal at Harper's Ferry.4 Today every standing committee of the Senate5 and
certain committees in the House of Representatives possess the power to sum-
mon and punish witnesses for contempt.
The first hundred years of congressional investigatory activity was directed
mainly toward the civil and military operations of the executive branch. r
Inquiries into varied socio-economic problems and into governmental scandals
ensued.8 "In the decade following World War II, there appeared a new hind of
congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history.... This
new phase of legislative inquiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives
and affairs of private citizens."" The "new phase" highlights the inquiries of
the present day and is epitomized by the investigations of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities. 10
Much has been written on the subject of congressional committees, e.amin-
ing their historical and constitutional foundations and appraising their present-
1. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 17S, 137-SS (1957), 1C5 U. Pa. L. Rev. 124.
See Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1957).
2. 2 Annals of Cong. 490 (1792). See Taylor, Grand Inquest 17-29 (1955).
3. 4 Cong. Deb. SS9 (1327). For what is perhaps the earliczt contempt proiccution
by Congress, see 5 Annals of Cong. 166-95 (1795).
4. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (159).
S. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 134, 60 Stat. 831.
6. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 121, 60 Stat. 822.
7. For a descriptive account of this period see Taylor, Grand Inque:t 33-34 (1955).
8. Taylor, Grand Inquest 51-57 (1955).
9. Watkins v. United States, 354 US. 173, 195 (1957).
10. For the original enabling resolution of the committee sce HR. Rez. 282, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess, S3 Cong. Rec. 756S, 7536 (1933). See also Carr, Invcztigations in Opzration:
The Un-American Actixities Committee, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 593 (1951).
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day role in the American governmental system.' But the subject of the rights,
defenses and privileges available to witnesses summoned to appear before such
committees has been treated with less frequency.12 Yet a witness "must decide
at the time the questions are propounded whether or not to answer. . . . [He]
acts at his peril... . An erroneous determination on his part, even if made in
the utmost good faith, does not exculpate him. . . ."1 This comment attempts
to examine generally the rights of witnesses before congressional committees.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WITNESSES
A. First Amendment
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble. . ".."14 The amendment is designed primarily to protect
beliefs and associational relationships from congressional legislation in order
to insure free and open discussion of all ideas.', Until 1957, its application to
congressional investigations remained in doubt."' In that year, Watkins v.
11. See generally Barth, Government by Investigation (1955); Carr, The House
Committee on Un-American Activities (2d ed. 1955) ; Taylor, Grand Inquest (1955);
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 153 (1926); McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 425 (1951); Merry, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope anti
Limitations, 40 A.B.A.J. 1073 (1954).
12. For three excellent treatments of this subject, see Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before
Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 337 (1953); Comment, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 671
(1957); Comment, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 645 (1958).
13. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957).
14. U.S. Const. amend. I.
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,
concurring); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948); 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 885 (8th ed. 1927). The rights of the
first amendment can justifiably be abridged by congressional legislation. E.g., Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("clear and present danger test"); United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ("gravity of the
evil, discounted by its improbability" test). See generally Mendelson, Clear and Present
Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 313 (1952); Comment, 65 Yale
L. J. 1159 (1956).
16. Several courts of appeals previously had rejected claims based on the first
amendment. E.g., Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 933 (1950) (chairman of an organization refused to produce books, relating to
solicitation and distribution of funds); Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950)(witness refused to answer questions In an
investigation of motion picture industry); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948)(assumed that the first amendment applied to
committees but justified the invasion); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948) (applicability of amendment to investigations
by Congress was rejected). In Rumely v. United States, a court of appeals upheld a
first amendment defense in an investigation of "lobbying activities." 197 F.2d 166 (D.C.
United States17 was decided by the Supreme Court. In reversing the contempt
conviction of a former labor official who had refused to identify certain names
propounded to him by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, the Court stated, in dictum, that a congres-ional investiga-
tion "is part of lawmaking" and therefore subject to the prohibitions of the
amendment.1 s Shortly thereafter, in Barenblatt v. Unitcd States,20 the Supreme
Court passed squarely on the first amendment question.-"" Finding it applicable
to congressional investigations, a divided Court, nevertheless, held that the
public need for information relating to the Communist Party outweighed the
rights of the witness under the first amendment.2 1
The result of Barenblatt and Watkins can be summarized as follows. When-
ever an investigation involves matters of speech or association, which perhaps
is the case in all inquiries of the Un-American Activities Committee, the first
amendment may be available to protect a witness' apparent right to silence or
his associational relationships. A witness who refuses to testify or produce
documents solely on the basis of the first amendment,22 however, does so at his
peril. There is no independent body to rule on the propriety of the assertion
while the hearing is in session. There can be no certainty until the matter is
finalized by the judiciary, because the Supreme Court, in Barcnblatt, committed
itself to a "balancing test" whenever first amendment rights are at stake. The
Court will balance the public need for information via the investigative pro-
Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court affirmed, but it did not base its decision on the firt
amendment. 345 U.S. 41 (1953). The failure of the Court to do so rculted in a concurring
opinion by Justices Douglas and Black. Id. at 43.
17. 354 U.S. 173 (1957).
18. Id. at 197.
19. 360 U.S. 109 (1959), 23 Fordham L. Rev. 522.
20. Petitioner, a former teacher, argued that an invcti-sation into matters of pzrzinal
belief and association violated his rights under the amendmtnt. His arqumcnt se-mcd to
be based on the idea that the first amendment includes a right to remain int and that
to compel testimony is violative of this right. While there has never bcan a sfquare
holding on this question by the Supreme Court, there have bccn intimations that the
amendment does include such a right. In Kilbourn v. Thompon, 103 U.S. 163 (1031),
the Supreme Court stated that "neither [House of Congrczs] ... possecses the general powcr
of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." Id. at 10. See, e g., Wat!nas v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 193; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US. 135, 173-74 (1927). It
would appear that the so-caled "right of privacy" is another way of faying that every
investigation by Congress must be related to a valid legislative purpose. Sce Lawzon v.
United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
21. The Court placed heavy emphasis on the Government's "right of EMf-prc:c.rvation"
against Communist attacks. 360 U.S. at 128-29. "An invecti:atin of advocacy of or
preparation for overthrow certainly embraces the right to idcntify a witne:3 as a mamber
of the Communist Party. . . ." Id. at 130. Given subjects involving national ccurity, a
majority of the Court seems inclined to defer to the legislative ex.rcise of the invcztigatory
process because "of necessity [it] ...must proceed step by stcp." Ibid.
22. It should be noted that a witness may raise more than one constitutional objection
to a question. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955).
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cess against the private interests of the witness. In striking this balance, the
Court will look at the legislative purpose behind the investigation, 23 though not
the motives of the investigators,24 the basis for the witness' appearance, and the
pertinency of the questions asked by the committee to the subject under
inquiry.25
Barenblatt and subsequent cases indicate that the assertion of the first
amendment is a futile gesture if communism is the subject under inquiry. 0
But it is to be noted that Barenblatt was decided by a five-to-four Court.2 7 Thus
a change in the composition of the Court might well reverse this trend.
B. Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment guarantees protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures,28 whether accomplished actually or constructively via a subpoena
duces tecum.29  The availability of the amendment as a defense to witnesses
appearing before congressional committees has never been clearly defined,
though there is dictum by the Supreme Court that "witnesses . . . cannot be
subjected to unreasonable search and seizure."30 Consequently, it would ap-
23. See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text. But the Court, citing Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 200, stated that there is no "power to expose for the sake of
exposure." 360 U.S. at 133.
24. "So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary
lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of
that power." 360 U.S. at 132, citing Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931), and
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904). The Court was explicit in saying that If
a legislative purpose exists, the motives of the investigators are unimportant. 360 U.S.
at 133. Accord, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
25. See notes 86-93 infra and accompanying text. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957), wherein the Court overturned a state investigation of a teacher's lecture
and Progressive Party affiliations, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, weighed each
question asked the witness against the state's interest. Id. at 255. See United States
v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957), where the "balance" was struck In favor of
the witness.
26. E.g., Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 362 U.S.
960 (1960); Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362
U.S. 926 (1960); Davis v. United States, 269 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1959). See McPhaul v.
United States, 272 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 81 Sup. Ct. 138 (1960).
27. In the majority were Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, Whittaker and Frankfurter.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan comprised the dissent.
28. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court established that
an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment is not
confined to actual entry upon premises but extends to enforced production of a person's
papers and documents. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924)(wrts of
mandamus) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1911) (subpoenas duces tecum).
30. 354 U.S. at 188. For a precise holding where a subpoena issued by a committee
constituted an uniawful search and seizure, see Strawn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 3
U.S.L. Week 646 (D.C. Sup. Ct. March 11, 1936), 36 Colum. L. Rev. 841.
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pear that if a committee employs a dragnet seizure of private papers, with
the hope that something might turn up,3 ' or issues a subpoena duces tecum
which lacks particularity, 2 or subpoenas papers without legislative authority,33
the amendment will be available as a defense. If there is a reasonable basis for
the issuance of a subpoena, however, it will not be available. In the case of
congressional committees, the expression "reasonable basis" is accorded a
liberal interpretation and is largely a matter for Congress to determine.'
A witness who possesses a defense under the fourth amendment or an ana-
logous procedural objection regarding the subpoena should assert it at the hear-
ing. In United States v. Bryan,3,5 the Supreme Court made it clear that "to deny
the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy it is in itself
a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes."' G6 And in the
recent McPhazd v. United States3 7 decision, the Court held that the Government
did not have to prove at a contempt trial that the witness had possession or
control of the subpoenaed documents or that they were even in existence, since
the witness had failed to raise such an objection at the hearing.
In many instances, a defense under the fourth amendment may equally be
available under the fifth amendment, either through the self incrimination or
31. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 US. 214, 221 t10$1)(Vubpeena duc!s
tecum invalid in part, so the entire subpoena fell); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U.S. 293, 305 (1924)(investigation of violations of antitrust laws; writs of mandamus
too broad). Compare Brown v. United States, 276 US. 134 (1923)(subpecna calling for
"all letters, telegrams or copies" over a five and one-half month pcriod valid); Wheelr
v. United States, 226 U.S. 47S (1913)(subpoena for "all letters and tckgram-, all ca.lh
books, ledgers, journals" for three months' period valid). For cases where general cub-
poenas were held valid sea CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957) ; Endicott Johnon Corp.
v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
32. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905)(grand jury invectig-ation; cubpa duces
tecum too broad); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 327 (1941). Compare Olahoma Prezs Publibing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 136 (1946).
33. United States v. Patterson, 2C6 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See Hearzt v. Blac, 87
F.2d 68, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (dictum).
34. See Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congrez3 To Punah Con-
tempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 Va. L. Rev. S37, 01-02 (1952).
35. 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
36. Id. at 333. Accord, United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950). See Richardzon
v. United States, 273 F.2d 144 (Sth Cir. 1959), where the court ztatcd: "A court ib not
compelled to believe the testimony or explanation of a vitn-s."' Id. at 14.
37. 81 Sup. Ct. 133 (1960)(five-to-four decision).
38. A subpoena duces tecum usually involves papers and documents which contain
incriminating material. Therefore, if a person is compellEd to produce such, he may asrt
his privilege against self incrimination, provided that the papers and documents are of a
personal nature. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1SM). See notes 46-49 infra and
accompanying text. On the other hand, a corporation does not have any protection under
the fifth amendment guarantee against self incrimination. Wilson v. United Statezs 221 U.S.
361 (1911). Yet it has some protection under the fourth amendment. Olahoma Preas
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 136, 205, 205 & n.35 (1946) (dictum).
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due process clauses. 39 Alone, however, the fourth amendment defense affords
little protection to a witness.
C. Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment contains a privilege against self incrimination and a
guarantee that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ....
1. Self Incrimination
The privilege that "no person shall be ...compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . ." originated at the common law as a reaction
against the trials by inquisition of the Star Chamber. 4' Adopted as a basic part
of the Bill of Rights in 1791, it was not until the Supreme Court's decision in
McCarthy v. Arndstein42 that its applicability to civil proceedings was firmly
established. Whether it was available to witnesses appearing before congressional
committees, however, was in doubt until the 1955 decisions of the Supreme
Court in Quinn v. United States43 and Emspak v. United States.44 In Quinn,
the Court upheld the invocation of the privilege before a committee and stated
that
the Self-Incrimination Clause "must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the
right it was intended to secure." Such liberal construction is particularly warranted
in a prosecution of a witness for a refusal to answer [before a committee] .... 45
Although the Supreme Court has given a liberal construction to the use of
the privilege before congressional committees, the privilege is not all encom-
passing. It is not available to corporations 40 or unincorporated organizations. 47
Rather, it is a personal privilege for natural persons.48 Nor is it available to cor-
39. A subpoena duces tecum must request papers and documents material to the
subject under inquiry or else the due process requirement of pertinency will not have
been satisfied. See notes 89-93 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
40. U.S. Const. amend. V.
41. See Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Crimination, Its History, 15 Harv. L. Rev.
610 (1902). See also Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); Williams, Problems
of the Fifth Amendment, 24 Fordbam L. Rev. 19 (1955).
42. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). The Court stated: "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent
upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It
applies both to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to
criminal responsibility him who gives it." Id. at 40. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892).
43. 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
44. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
45. 349 U.S. at 162.
46. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) ; Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911).
47. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944).
48. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 69 (1906); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91 (1906).
(Vol. 29
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porate officers with respect to corporate papers and documents, 49 even if they
would incriminate the officers. Public records do not fall within the ambit of the
privilege.o It appears that the privilege is applicable only "against prosecution
by the government compelling the witness to answer . ." 1 and that it does
not protect against possible violations of state law,, 2 or, for that matter,
prosecutions which would be barred by the statute of limitations, or because of a
pardon.5 3 loreover, the privilege does not relate to future acts4 or anticipated
questions 5 which might subject a witness to incrimination.
Though it may sometimes appear to the contrary, a witness is not excused
from testifying before a committee "merely because he declares that in so doing
he would incriminate himself. . ., The testimony sought must be such that
it would support a conviction under a federal criminal statute or furnish a link
in a chain of evidence leading toward a criminal prosecution. 7  A question
49. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 699 (1944). See AMcPhaul v. United States, S1 Sup. Ct. 133 (19G0); Boyd v. Urdtcd
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1M).
50. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1943). See WiLston v.LUnitcd State-, 221 U.S.
361, 380 (1911), where the Court stated that this "principle applies not only to public
documents in public offices, but also to records required by law to be kept in order that
there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of
governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions xalidly establihed?' Se- the
cases cited by the Court. Id. at 381.
51. United States v. 'Murdock, 2S4 U.S. 141, 149 (1931); United States v. Greenberg,
192 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1911). But see United States v. Di Carth, 102 F. Supp. 597 (.D.
Ohio 1952).
52. Considerable doubt exists concerning the present worth of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Murdock, 2S4 U.S. 141 (1931). In Murdod, the Court [aid
that the privilege against self incrimination does not extend to future pr ,cutiens under
state law. Id. at 14S-49. Yet in a few cases the Court has granted witne:es immunity
from future prosecutions under state law apparently to replace the protection afiorded by
the privilege. E.g., Reina -v United States, S1 Sup. Ct. 260 (1960) (grand jury invctigation of
violations of federal narcotics law) ; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S 422 (1956) (grand jury
investigation of attempts to endanger the national security). See Adams v. Marland, 347
U.S. 179 (1954)(disclosed testimony at a Senate investigation xcduded from state pro:ecu-
tion). See generally Danforth, Another Feldman-Another Day-The Use in Federal Crimi-
nal Proceedings of Testimony Compelled by a State Immunity Statute--A Fair Solution, 29
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 75 (1960).
53. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. S91, 593-99
(1896)(dictum); United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547, 550 (W.D. Ky. 1943)
(dictum).
54. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
55. United States v. Greenberg, 1S7 F.2d 35, 33 (3d Cir. 1931).
56. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 4S6 (1951), 50 Mlich. L. Rev. (05 (1952).
57. Id. at 4S6; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955). See Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), where the Court said that the queztion "w~re you ever
employed by the Communist Party . . ." will justify a reliance on the privilege agcainLt Celf
incrimination. Compare 'Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917) (reasonable cauz2 to
apprehend danger from a direct answer), with United States v. Coffey, 193 F-2d 433
(3d Cir. 1952) (innocuous question may support the assertion of the prviklege).
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may be innocuous on its face and the privilege still available if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the answer might subject the witness to
incrimination.58 It may be incumbent upon the witness to offer a plausible
reason at a contempt trial why his answers are likely to incriminate. 9 In
Hoffman v. United States,0 0 the Supreme Court said that it would sustain the
privilege unless it is "'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s]
cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate."0 1
A witness must affirmatively assert his privilege against self incrimination,
though no "ritualistic formula" is necessary for its assertion.0 2 A pleading
via "the fifth amendment" 63 or "the first amendment supplemented by the fifth
amendment" 64 has been found sufficient. A witness, however, may unwittingly
waive the privilege. "Disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details."0 5
The privilege is not waived by a witness if he asserts that he "always upheld
the Constitution"66 or says that an admission would not subject him to a
criminal prosecution. 67 It is waived as to the contents of an article if he admits
authorship of the article,68 or as to the identity of a person receiving books be-
longing to the Communist Party if he admits membership in the Party, and
possession and delivery of the books to that person.69
Unlike the first amendment, the invocation of the privilege against self
incrimination before congressional committees has met with general success.
Yet it has failed to protect witnesses from disgrace, obloquy and scorn re-
sulting from community attitudes. 70 Consequently, witnesses in recent years
have come to use the first amendment more often.
58. See United States v. Coffey, supra note 57. Compare Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486-88 (1951).
59. Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1950).
60. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
61. Id. at 488.
62. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955). See also Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 170 (1955).
63. United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951). See Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137, 142 (1949) ("I want to claim privilege as to anything that I say.").
64. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
65. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
66. United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1952).
67. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 197 (1955).
68. Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co., 205 Fed. 827 (D. Conn. 1913).
69. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See Note, 61 Yale L. J. 105 (1952).
See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d
837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942) (all elements of crime revealed before assertion of the privilege)
Annot., 147 A.L.R. 255 (1943).
70. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896), where the Court said that the
privilege does not protect against such. 52 Stat. 942 (1937), 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1958),
provides: "No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any
paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either House of Congress, or by any joint
committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
[Vol. 29
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Iimmunity
A grant of immunity to a witness against future prosecution resulting from
his testimony may dispense with the privilege against self incrimination. Such
a possibility was suggested by the Supreme Court as early as 1892. In
Counsel;nan v. Hitchcock,7' a unanimous Court invalidated an immunity sta-
tute72 pertaining to witnesses before grand juries on the basis that it merely
excluded disclosed testimony at a future prosecution and did not afford pro-
tection against a prosecution based on such testimony. The Court declared
that "in view of the constitutional provision [fifth amendment], a statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prose-
cution for the offence to which the question relates.173 Another statute was
enacted 4 to afford such immunity and was held constitutional in Brown v.
Walker.75
The present immunity statute governing witnesses before congressional
committees is of recent origin. Enacted in 1954,76 it relates to investigations
concerned with national security subjects and provides that
no . . witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or
on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning v;hich he is so compelled,
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding... against him in any court.
Whether this specific immunity provision will survive constitutional attack is
uncertain. An analogous provision 77 in the same section vas tested in Ullvanin v.
United States78 and found constitutional because it was coextensive with the
privilege against self incrimination. The Court held that the immunity of the
or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his tectimony to cuch fact or
his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or othcrwi e render him infamous."
71. 142 U.S. 547 (1392).
72. Rev. Stat. § 860 (1S75).
73. 142 U.S. at 5S6. See United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951).
74. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 33, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1953).
75. 161 U.S. 591 (1396).
76. 1S U.S.C. § 3486(a) (195S). Although the statute would ccrm to require a prior
assertion of the fifth amendment before a grant of immunity can be givcn, it has not bn
so construed. Adams v. Maryland, 347 US. 179 (1954). The statute exprec:ly Lxccpta from
its coverage a subsequent prosecution for perjury committed in giving the tcctimony. See
also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), where the Court said that the. statute did
not bar the use of disclosed testimony at a trial for willful default. Compare Act of Jan. 24,
1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156, which precluded a subsequent prosccution based on material
disclosed by a witness before a committee. Five years later, this statute was amendcd to
exclude only the use of the disclosed testimony at a sub.cquent prosecution. Act of Jan. 24,
1362, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
77. 13 U.S.C. § 3436(c) (1953).
73. 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Accord, Reina v. United States, 31 Sup. Ct. 2C,) (I9C). Sea
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
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provision under consideration extended to prosecutions under state law. That
the Court had to so hold is questionable because the privilege itself apparently
does not extend to violations of state law.79
Probably because of the suspicion that the statute may be unconstitutional,
congressional committees have rarely used this immunity provision. It has been
urged that the entire section is unconstitutional because it does not protect
against prosecutions in which the disclosed material sets in motion a chain of
events leading "to numerous accusations not within the purview of the question
and answer." 80 The dissent in Ullmann suggests a case where a witness who has
testified before a committee commits a subsequent act for which his testimony
can be used against him.8' It can be argued that the suggested case is not a good
one because the immunity should not be construed to apply to future acts.
It is not "an invitation to commit crime," but rather a protection for acts
committed prior to the giving of the testimony. A more difficult case would be
where the witness' testimony furnishes a clue or hint as to a past act not "with-
in the purview of the question and answer." 8 2 No definitive answer can be given
as to this kind of case, but it would appear that if a direct answer would in-
criminate the witness for any past act, the immunity would be available.
2. Due Process
Since the power to investigate is almost always enforced through the federal
judiciary,8 3 the due process safeguards of criminal justice become operative.84
It is axiomatic that every federal statute must be definite enough to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will constitute a crime.88
The statute applicable to witnesses appearing before congressional committees
requires as a basis for a contempt conviction either a willful default to produce
documents or a refusal to answer any question "pertinent to the question under
inquiry."8 6 Initially, however, the question under inquiry must be related to a
79. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. But see United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F.
Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1952), where a witness was allowed to invoke the privilege
against self incrimination with respect to questions addressed to violations of state law.
80. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 444 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 445.
82. See Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917); Heike v. United States,
227 U.S. 131, 143-44 (1913); United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952).
83. See notes 132-33 infra and accompanying text.
84. Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 (1958), 11 Stan. L. Rev. 164.
85. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-24 (1954); United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1926);
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921). See also Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957).
86. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). See text accompanying note 133 Infra.
It should be noted that the statute applies to a witness who appears before a committee but
leaves the room without testifying. Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
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valid legislative purposes7 and be within the jurisdiction of the particular
committee. s
Certain procedural rights for witnesses have been established by case law. A
witness is entitled to know what subject is under inquiry, what legislative pur-
pose is being furthered, and what connection exists between the questions ashed
and the subject under inquiry. 9 If he objects to a question on grounds of per-
tinency, the committee must inform him that his answer is wanted regardlem of
the objection? In IWratkins v. United States, the Supreme Court ex.plicitly
stated that pertinency of the questions must appear "with undisputable
clarity."2' It is to be noted, however, that pertinency relates to the subject,
and not the person,92 and that it is not the same as relevancy in the law of
evidence.?3
Just when a question will be pertinent can only be determined by an examina-
tion of the subject under inquiry in the context of the particular hearing. If a
S7. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929)(invetigation of e.xting laws);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927) (investigation for future legiation). See
Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 US. 163 (1331), discussed at note 104 infra and accompanying
text. See Comment, 5 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 645, 649-52 (1953).
SS. E.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (inquiry by House of Rcpreznta-
tives invalidated); United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Ma:s. 1956)(Senate
inquiry improper). See also Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1953); Unitcd States
v. Patterson, 205 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1953); notes 107-03 infra and accompanying test.
S9. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1959); United States v. l'at'ins,
354 U.S. at 20S-19; Davis v. United States, 269 F.2d 357, 361 (th Cir. 1959). SEn United
States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 3S3 (D.D.C. 1956).
90. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1955). A vitnes3 must ba "confronted
with a dear-cut choice between compliance and noncompliance, Letween answering the
question and risking prosecution for contempt." Id. at 166. Given such a choice and a
subsequent refusal to answer, the necessary criminal intent will have been establiLhcd. See
Flaxer v. United States, 35S U.S. 147 (1953); Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653 (5th
Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 960 (1960); United States v. Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757
(D.D.C. 1952). See also Davis v. United States, supra note S9, at 362, where the circum-
stances indicated that the witness had a fair apprisal of the committee's ruling.
91. 354 U.S. at 214. See Barenblatt v. United States, 3L0 US. at 124. In %Vatkit,, the
Court said that pertinency could be established by refercnce either to the authorizing
resolution of the committee, the opening statement of the chairman, the nature of the
proceedings, the questions asked, or the chairman's response to an objection. 354 U.S. at
209-15.
92. See United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 143, 153 (3d Cir. 1953), and caacs cited
therein. In Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
339 U.S. 258 (1950), the court of appeals stated: "Authoritative determination of per-
tinency is a function of the court; and the witness acts at his peril in refuing to anewer."
Id. at 57.
93. "A legislative inquiry anticipates all possible cases which may arise thereunder and
the evidence admissible must be responsive to the scope of the inquiry, which generally is
very broad." Tovnsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303
US. 664 (1933). See United States v. Deutch, 147 F. Supp. S9, 92 (D.D.C. 1956), afu'd,
2S0 F.ad 691 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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question has a reasonable connection with the subject under inquiry, so that a
possible, and not actual, answer might be pertinent, the question will be deemed
pertinent.94 Some questions are usually found to be pertinent, e.g., "are you a
member of the Communist Party," "have you ever been a member of the Com-
munist Party," and "were you ever a member of X Club of the Communist
Party while at X University?" 95 Questions of the "whether-you-know-a-certain-
person" and "do-you-know-a-certain-person" type are of doubtful validity.°0
One distinction between the two lines of questioning lies in the fact that the
former relates to the witness' actual participation in an activity, while the latter
to another's participation.
D. Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel. .... -97 In a congressional hearing, a witness has no right
to counsel, confrontation of witnesses, or cross-examination. 8 It has been sug-
gested that this result is correct because such a witness should have no greater
rights than a witness in a court of law.09 As a practical matter, however, wit-
nesses are usually allowed to confer with counsel, inside and outside the com-
mittee room.'00
II. JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSES
A. Objection to Jurisdiction of Congress
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is nowhere expressed in the
Constitution. Yet, through use and judicial construction the power is well-
established. It may only be exercised as an incident to an express or implied
power, i.e., in furtherance of a legislative purpose. 101 The courts will presume
94. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Kamin,
135 F. Supp. 382, 388 (D. Mass. 1955). See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299
(1929). It should be noted that both parts of a question must be pertinent. United States
v. Kamin, supra at 385.
95. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1959) ; Lawson v. United States, 176
F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
96. See Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v.
Kamin, 135 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1955).
97. U.S. Const. amend VI.
98. See Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.UL.
Rev. 359-60 (1953); Merry, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limita-
tions, 40 A.B.A.J. 1100-01 (1954).
99. Wiles, Congressional Investigations: A Re-examination of the Basic Problem,
41 A.B.A.J. 538 (1955).
100. See Davis v. United States, 269 F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 1959). But see United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 374 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
101. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-76 (1927). See United States v. Norris,
300 U.S. 564 (1937) (investigation of campaign expenditures); Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263 (1929) (investigation of a lease of government oil reserves); Barry v. United
States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (inquiry into election returns); In re
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a legislative purpose if Congress can legislate in the investigated area and if the
information sought might materially aid the congressional consideration.' 2 The
courts generally are hesitant to question the motives of the investigators.10 3
judicial upheaval of an investigation on grounds that Congrms lacks juris-
diction has been infrequent. In Kilbozrn v. Thompson, 0 5 decided in 1831, the
Supreme Court for the first time held a particular investigation to be outside
the power of Congress. There the Court reasoned that an investigation into the
workings of a real estate pool in which the United States Government was a
creditor was judicial in nature and therefore beyond the power of Congres. Also
beyond the power of Congress is an investigation into matters which are ex-
clusively local in nature.0 5 In Watkins v. United States, the Court unequi-
vocally stated that there is no congressional power "of e.posure."'u 5 Therefore,
it would seem that an investigation for this purpose is beyond the power of
Congress.
Since there are few matters beyond the scope of Congress' powers, lac: of
jurisdiction is not an effective defense. However, it remains a defense whenever
Congress fails to act for a bona fide legislative purpose.
B. Objection to Jurisdiction of Committee
Contempt proceedings have failed in several cases because the particular
committee did not act within the confines of its enabling resolution.167 In
United States v. Rz,ely, Is the Supreme Court invalidated a House investiga-
tion of "lobbying activities." The approach of the Court was to interpret the
committee's authorizing resolution in order to ascertain whether the committee
had authority to conduct the investigation in question. The Court narrowly
interpreted the resolution and found the investigated activity to be outside the
scope of that resolution. If it had found authority for the investigation, the
Court would have been faced with the constitutional question of Congress'
jurisdiction."('
The resolution of the Committee on Un-American Activities has received con-
siderable attention by the courts."10 Though attacked for its broad scope, it has
been found constitutional."'
Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1S97) (investiation of speculation by Senators in fugar toZs
where a tariff bill was before the Senate).
102. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); McGrain v. Daugherty, Eupra
note 101, at 173; United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 14S, 157 (3d Cir. 1953). Cumulative
testimony is permissible if there is a valid legislative purpose in the firt instance. United
States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 333, 333 (D.D.C. 1956).
103. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
104. 103 US. 16S (SS1).
105. United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601-02 (Nfl. Ohio 1952) (dictum).
106. 354 U.S. at 200.
107. See note 3S supra.
103. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
109. Id. at 44, 53.
110. For a detailed history of the committee's authorizing rcolution see Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. at 113-22 and the authorities citcd therdn.
111. Watkins v. United States cast grave doubt on its validity under the firt and fifth
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The objection to a committee's jurisdiction is interrelated with the pertinency
objection. A question may be pertinent to the subject under inquiry and yet
that subject may be outside the jurisdiction of the committee.112 In such a case,
there can be no contempt. Moreover, a question may be pertinent to some
aspect of the committee's jurisdiction but not to the particular subject under
inquiry." 3 Here, also, there can be no contempt.
III. OTHER PRIVILEGES AND DEFENSES
A. Confidential Relationships
Whether the privileges arising out of confidential relationships, such as
attorney-client, physician-patient, clergyman-penitent and husband-wife, are
available before congressional committees has received little attention by the
courts. There is dictum in some cases, however, that the privileges are avail-
able." 4 A Senate report indicates that it has been committee practice to observe
these privileges." 5
B. Executive Privilege
The existence of a privilege on the part of the executive branch to withhold
information from Congress has been a subject of some dispute.'10 References
in several cases seem to indicate that no such privilege exists."1 It is argued
that there should be a distinction between "state secrets" and other than state
secrets." 8 The former, it is said, concerns diplomatic and military matters and
therefore should be privileged.
amendments. 354 U.S. at 201-05. The strictures which existed in that opinion were qualified
by the Supreme Court's language in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 116-23.
112. See United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
113. See Comment, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 648 n.33 (1958).
114. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937); United States v. Keeney, 111
F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But
see MacCracken v. Jurney, 72 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 294 U.S.
125 (1935).
115. Staff of Subcomm. on Rules and Administration, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Rules of
Procedure for Senate Investigating Committees (Subcomm. Print 1955), which stated:
"[I]t has been committee practice to observe the testimonial privileges of witnesses with
respect to communications between clergyman and parishioner, doctor and patient, lawyer
and client, and husband and wife."
116. See Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47
Calif. L. Rev. 3 (1959).
117. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-71 (1957); Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In Reynolds,
the court of appeals said that a "sweeping privilege against any disclosure" would be
against public policy. Id. at 995. Crosby v. Pacific S.S. Lines, 133 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 752 (1943). See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
118. United States v. Reynolds, supra note 117, at 9-10. When "there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged . .. the occasion for the privilege Is
appropriate. .. ." Id. at 10. See also Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 116, at 41-45.
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C. Lack of Quorzo
Article 1, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution permits each House of Con-
gress to determine the rules of its proceedings. 110 Consequently, a procedural
defense such as that of lack of quorum must be viewed in the context of the
rules governing the particular committee. A one-man subcommittee may be a
duly constituted bodyY10 A witness would be well-advised to raise a quorum
objection at the committee hearing. Failure of the witness to do so in Unitcd
States v. Bryan'2 'l made impossible a defense based on lack of quorum at the
contempt trial.
D. Atmospkere
Regulation of the committee atmosphere is largely a matter for Congr s.2-
Yet there is authority for the proposition that if the committee room does not
lend itself to a deliberate and truthful disclosure of facts, a witness can properly
refuse to testify. In United States v. Kleinman, 2-3 a district court stated, in
acquitting defendants of a contempt charge, that "there were, in close proximity
to the witness, television cameras, newsreel cameras, news photographers with
their concomitant flashbulbs, radio microphones, a large and crowded hearing
room with spectators standing along the walls. .... '2" In United States v.
Moran, 25 however, it was no defense that microphones, television cameras and
photographers were present in the hearing room. United States v. Orwan'-2
has suggested as a test whether the presence of such enters into the determina-
tion not to answer. If they do, the witness has a defense. 27
IV. CONTLEUPT PROCAD=UES
When a witness summoned to appear before a congressional committee re-
fuses to testify or produce requested documents and papers, what contempt
procedures are available to Congress?'-" The contumacious witness may be
119. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 5, ci. 2.
120. E.g., Flaxer v. United States, 35S U.S. 147 (195); Unitcd Statez v. Moran, 194
F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 559 (N.D.
Ohio 1952).
121. 339 US. 323 (1950). But see Christoffel v. United Statc:, 33S US. C4, 59-1,0
(1949), where the Court held that the presence of a quorum is a nececcsary elemcnt for the
crime of perjury. See also Mleyers v. United States, 171 F-2d 1D , 311 (D.C. Cir. 194!)
(dictum).
122. See justice and Television: Some Thoughts on Congreczzional Inveztigatioi, 3S
A.-B..J. 15 (1952).
123. 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952), 51 Mlich. L. Rcv. 1072 (1993), 37 Blinn. L.
Rev. 297 (1953).
124. Id. at 40S.
125. 194 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
126. 207 F.2d 143, 159 (3d Cir. 1953).
127. See United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. BMacs. 1956). There the court
said that a vitness should raise an objection to committee atmo-phcre at the hcaring and
not for the first time at the contempt trial. Id. at 794 & n.2
123. A witness can also be prosecuted for perjury. 13 US.C. § 1621 (1953). Scc, e.g.,
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brought before the bar of the House or Senate, tried for his refusal and punished,
either by fine, reprimand or imprisonment.12 This procedure was formally
sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States as long ago as 1821,
where, in Anderson v. Dunn,130 Congress punished a private citizen for attempt-
ing to bribe a member of Congress. The reasoning of the decision was that Con-
gress has an inherent power to punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt so as
to prevent obstructions to the legislative process.13 ' Since 1857,132 Congress has
rarely resorted to this inherent power, relying instead upon a federal act making
contempt of Congress a misdemeanor "punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment.., for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months." 3 3 Criminal contempt, embodied in Section 192 of
Title 2 of the United States Code, is handled by the United States Attorney
United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623, 626
(2d Cir. 1952) (testimony must have a natural tendency to influence, impede or dissuade
the committee). See also Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States
v. Fraser, 145 F. 2d 145 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 842 (1945).
129. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661 (1897). But see Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917) (slanderous attacks presented
no immediate obstruction to legislative processes). See also Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (witness called before Senate after having given
testimony before a committee). McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)(refusal to
obey a committee subpoena followed by a warrant requiring witness to appear before the
bar of the Senate).
If tried before Congress, a witness may obtain judicial review of the proceeding.
Jurney v. MacCracken, supra (habeas corpus); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881) (suit for false imprisonment).
130. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
131. It was stated in Anderson that imprisonment under the inherent contempt power
cannot extend beyond the adjournment date of Congress. Id. at 231, where the Court
stated: "[T]he existence of the power that imprisons is indispensable to its continuance:
and although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to
exist, on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows, that imprison-
ment must terminate with that adjournment."
132. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 1, 11 Stat. 155.
133. 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). The statute has application to
witnesses voluntarily appearing before congressional committees. Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929). It is of interest to note that the existence of a statutory crime of
contempt does not impair the inherent power of Congress to punish a witness for con-
tempt. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). This power of Congress can be exercised
even _though the act of contempt has been completed. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S.
125 (1935). The act, however, must present an obstruction to the legislative process.
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
An interesting question arises as to the applicability of the due process safeguards when
Congress itself exercises the contempt power. Intimations exist that such safeguards do not
apply. See Marshall v. Gordon, supra at 542-43, 548. The only requirement would appear
to be that the matter under investigation be within the jurisdiction of Congress. Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). Yet a witness could probably purge himself of
contempt, which would be for Congress to decide. Jurney v. MacCracken, supra at 152.
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General's Office.' 34 The committee before which the offense occurs must initially
report and file a statement of the facts constituting the offense with either the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House. If either body approves, the
respective officer must certify the statement of facts to the appropriate United
States attorney. A grand jury will investigate the matter and perhaps render an
indictment alleging the necessary elements for the crime of contempt.105 This
is followed by a jury trial, at which the adversaries are put to their proof.1' 0
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably Congress has a right and duty to use investigating committees
in aid of legislation and to insure the effective administration of existing laws.
At the same time, Congress has a responsibility to the witnesses appearin- be-
134. 52 Stat. 942 (1933), 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1953).
135. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). In United States v. Lament, 13 F.R.D. 27 (S.DMN.Y.
1955), af'd, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956), a district court stated that the indictrnt must
contain the following essentials: "(1) that the committee before which the alleqefd rcfucal
to answer occurred was duly empowered by either House of Congress to conduct the
particular inquiry, setting forth the source of this authority; (2) that the inquiry vas
within the scope of the authority granted to the committee; (3) that the questions which
the witness declined to answer were pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry then
being conducted by the committee; and (4) that the witneus' refusal to answer vs
willful, or deliberate and intentional." Id. at 37. See Note, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev. 223
(1957). See also United States v. Deutch, 235 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1956)("unlavfully
refused to answer" sufficient allegation).
136. The Government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
questions asked by the committee are pertinent. E.g., Bowers v. United States, 202 F2d
447 (D.C. Cir 1953). It has been held that pertinency is a queztion of law and, con-
sequently, a matter for the courts to decide. Sinclair v. United Statez, 279 U.S. 263, 293
(1929). But see United .States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1953), where a court of
appeals said: "In the instant case, however, evidence aliunde was introduced to prove
pertinency. The weight and probative value of this evidence was for the jury, particularly
since pertinency was an element of the criminal offense. We conclude that in this situation
the trial court, taking the evidence as true, retains the power to decide that prtinency
has not been established. But if the court concludes that pertinency has been proven, it is
proper for it so to rule and then to submit the question and the evidence to the jury
under appropriate instructions." Id. at 156. It is to be noted that a mistaken belief on the
part of the witness as to the law is no defense. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263,
299 (1929).
Each refusal to answer may constitute a separate contempt unless "the separate queztions
seek to establish but a single fact, or relate to but a single subject of inquiry... ." United
States v. Orman, supra at 160. In such a case, there can be only one contempt. Ibid. See
also Yates v. United States, 355 US. 66, 63 (1957); United States v. Costello, 193 F.2d
20D, 204 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 14S, 160 (3d Cir. 1953). If
there are separate counts but only one punishment, that punishment cannot e.xcced
the ma-dmum penalty for any one count. See, e.g., Gilmore v. United States, 223 F.2d 121,
124 (5th Cir. 1956); Estep v. United States, 223 F.2d 19 (th Cir. 1955). The above cases
also establish that a contempt conviction wiU be sustained as lng as one count is valid.
See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 115, and the casc cited by the Court.
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fore its committees. Supervision of committee personnel is an important part
of this responsibility. Also important is regulation of committee procedures
guaranteeing witnesses a fair hearing. The present status of the law in this
area is, unfortunately, somewhat unsettled. Witnesses must invoke constitutional
rights and raise procedural defenses at their peril. Only after a prolonged and
expensive contempt proceeding does the validity of the defense or objection be-
come certain. Yet, what is true in one case may not be true in the next. It is
apparent, therefore, that only congressional legislation can change the situation,
particularly inasmuch as an investigation is a legislative function and the
hearing itself is not a judicial trial. Given legislation, witnesses would be more
prone to testify and cooperate with Congress, which, after all, is the purpose
behind a witness' appearance before a committee.
